Russian Identity
Introduction
In my research, I will study identity of Russia, its national
identity and their meaning for international politics. I also aim to show that
identity is important in state construction.
First, I would like to mention that an issue of identity is
quite important as it provides certain characteristics of state. It describes
state and resolves questions of state identification. It characterizes state in
the context of other states. Besides, it constructs an idea of state.
Hopf states that identities are necessary in international
politics in order to ensure some level of predictability and order. A world
without identities is a world of chaos, a world of uncertainty. Identities
perform necessary functions in a society: they tell you and others who you are
and they tell you who others are. A state understands others according to the
identity it attributes to them, and reproduces its own identity (Hopf 1998:
174).
In constructivism, identity is an important creative factor.
Identity plays an important role in the world politics. Identities are produced
by interactions, institutions, norms and cultures. Identities are important for
the construction of the state (Wendt 1992).
Understanding how identities are constructed, what norms and
practices accompany their reproduction, and how they construct each other is a
major part of the constructivist research program. Constructivism assumes, a
priori, that identities are potentially part of the constitutive practices of
the state, and so, productive of its actions at home and abroad. Different
states behave differently towards other states, based on the identities of each
(Hopf 1998, 174).
Identity of state in international politics is quite
important as it characterizes state internally and internationally. Every
identity brings in itself a certain knowledge about the state, its internal and
external issues, as well as state behavior. Russian state has its peculiar role
in the world. It is a huge power, which has it's specific national identity and
which occupies special position in the world order. To see Russia's development
in history, it has undergone many changes, and during the history the state
identity of Russia was formed. Dramatic changes, which characterized all the
history of Russian Empire were significant and reflected a strong nature of
Russian state. Its position in the world order defines Russian state as a
global power.
On the other hand, national identity of Russia is very strong.
It is based on hundreds years of history, culture and traditions. National
identity together with language, traditions, culture, is main characteristic of
Russian nation and forms the basis of its self-definition. Russian national
identity has therefore certain spiritual and materialistic soil which includes
also culture and politics of state. National identity of Russia has main
identification character.
Russian identity is very unique in Western civilization. It's
peculiarities lie within historical development and its specific features in
comparison to Western civilization in general. Russian identity has its own
value and is motivated by internal factors, as well as by external factors, for
example in the context of the EU, by other neighboring states and world
politics. As far as we go further, Russia becomes more developed and
interconnected in the world and West. In the context of constructivism, it will
sound as a state construction, and a theoretically approved fact.
In case of geopolitics, Russia is in strategic position, in
the centre of Eurasia. It is divided with Ural mountains into European and
Asian parts. It is a country with huge natural resources, including oil, gas
and gold.
Another important issue is Russian Orthodoxy, which
influences Russian state and culture, as well as it forms the Russian identity
from its side. Phrases like ”81% of Russians identify themselves as Orthodox”,
”To be Russian is to be Orthodox”, ”The special contribution of Orthodoxy to
the history of Russia is the development of Russia´s spiritually” are significant.
Special status of Orthodoxy over all other religious traditions in Russia is
stated. On the other hand the alternatives to the future of Orthodox church are
presented, for example, removing the church from the direct participation in
politics, as well as keeping the state separated from the church. Thus the
place of the church and other religious organizations is challenged in Russia.
The search for Russian national identity is an important
trend. Russians have easily identified with standard, dominant Russian cultures
- be they Russian Orthodox, Russian Imperial or Russian Soviet. It was other
peoples of the empire, in particular Moslem and Western Christian (Roman
Catholic and Protestant), who had problems. This is why during hundreds years
Russians did not have very strong ethnic identity, whereas their many
non-Russian neighbors did. However, this has been changing lately (Ponarin
1999).
Russian national identity has been an important issue
especially during the rule of Putin. There is a certain trend towards
strengthening a prestige and national self-identity of state. The problem of
identity of Russia has been quite actual during the last 15 years and it is
connected with the problem of balance of power. New identity of Russia is
formed, but there is some uncertainty. Russia is undergoing important changes
in politics and it is considered to be a powerful, but quite unpredictable
nation.
Official point of view by Igor Ivanov (2001) is that Russia's
foreign policy is based on national interests rather than political ideology.
He says, Russia believes that the settlement of international problems on a
collective basis in strict accordance with the rules of international law will
become a fundamental principle of Russian system. The scope of Russia's
activities is expanding to include international cooperation aimed at
responding to new global threats and challenges (Ivanov 2001: 12-13).
By reflecting its interests in the world politics, Russian
state constitutes to the world order of states. It has its specific identity
and behavior, therefore it signifies its important role in the world and makes
a commitment to world political composition and behavior. Second, ideas and behavior
are important in shaping International Relations, and Russia behaves
accordingly to international rules.
In my paper, I am going to study the identity of Russia. I
will mostly concentrate on how Russia formed its identity in the past and in
the present, and I will question, why it is so important to identify Russia as
a nation. I will look closer on Russia's history. Besides, I will make a brief
description between the view of Russian identity introduced by Russian, as well
as Western scholars, who reflect ideas about Russian identity, and I will
examine these issues.
Question of identity is quite important because it touches
historical, geopolitical and other aspects. Therefore, I will consider these
aspects and place them as the most important in the formation of Russian
identity. I will use a theory of constructivism to show, how the identity is
formed in the aspect of states formation and in the wider context, including
the identity of Russia as a peculiar phenomenon in history. My paper will also
include the brief observation of the history of Russia, of Russian identity
nowadays and the analysis of the official position of Russia in politics. I
will therefore examine national specifics, as well as traditions of Russia.
Formation of Russian identity is a challenging topic for me. Besides, I will
base my research on other sources of formation of national identity, including
views of most well-known Russian politicians.
I see the subject of my study up to date, because of the
search of Russian identity nowadays. Due to some changes in the internal and
external politics of Russia, it brought some changes in the order of states, as
well as it influenced the identity of Russia, the way how the other states see
Russian nation, and how the identity in Russia is formed.
I find it an interesting topic because of the constructivist
theoretical implications. It is important to see Russia in the context of state
formation, in the context of other states, and to see which role does Russia
plays in the world politics. It is also important to understand the process,
which determines the manner in which Russia interacts. It is interesting,
because throughout the history, geopolitics determined Russia's stand in the
world, determined its behavior, as well as provided a good economical ground
for development.
Methodology
In my research, the main emphasis is on the
method, which I am going to use. The main aim is to see how it can be applied
in my work, and what generalizations it may bring with it. The empirical
method which I am going to use in my research is generally meant as the
collection of a large amount of data on which to base a theory or derive a
conclusion in science. I will use this research method as a class of
research methods in which empirical observations or data are
collected in order to answer particular research questions. I will start with
some priori theories, which I will develop to try to explain and/or predict
what happens in the real world.(Moody, 2002) The purpose of the research is to
test the theory and possibly refine it. The research questions that I will ask
are concerned mainly on what the identity of Russia is, and how it is viewed by
Western and Russian scholars. I will define a theory of constructivism, and
apply it to my research question to prove its validity.
I tried to observe some material which explains the main
theory on my topic. For example, according to Manheim, the most effective way
to find an accurate answer to a research question is to employ established
methods of empirical research to investigate the relationships we see in the
world. Transforming our general research question into one or several specific
ones requires developing some plausible explanations for what we
observe.(Manheim 2002:14) One of the first problems in research is to devise
ways of getting from the abstract level of our questions to some concrete
observation that will allow us to answer them (ibid.:51). When we attempt to
create possible explanations for events, we are theorizing or developing a
theory. Theory building is the first stage in the research process and why it
is essential that we understand the relationship between theory and research
(ibid.:15). In my paper, I will question some theories, for example,
constructivism, and on its basis, I will try to explain some developments of
Russian state and identity. The theory which I am going to develop is the one
which will seek the answer to the question: Is there Russian identity? What is
Russian identity? What are the values of Russian identity? Where did it come
from? My theoretical part will be discussed later on in the work. I aim to show
the significance of the research question from the view of IR theory,
constructivism. Therefore, I will explain some issues on behalf of my concern
of a theory, and will write on the topic of construction of an identity from a
theoretical perspective. Later on, I will see how the issue is seen in the eyes
of scholars and politicians, as well as I will apply theoretical views on the
issues of Russian identity and nation-building, answering the question of
construction of identity.
The quest for useful theory begins with the decisions we
make about the building blocks of theories: concepts. I will use concepts to
observe my theory and give a concrete analysis of my work. I will base my study
primarily on concepts, which will represent some idea. First, since we are
involved in empirical inquiry the concept must refer to phenomena that are at
least potentially observable. This does not mean that all concepts must refer
to directly observable things. Some of the most useful concepts in the social
sciences refer to properties we cannot observe directly. (Manheim 2002: 22).
Useful concepts have theoretical import. A concept has theoretical import when
it is related to enough other concepts in the theory that it plays an essential
role in the explanation of observed events (ibid.:23). My concept of this work
is to try to explain main questions of Russian identity, how it was
established, and how it seen nowadays by Russian and Western scholars, as well
as to see how this concept was developed and discussed by Russian politicians
in time in Russia, and what kind of perspective I see on the basis of their
ideas. My concept is to give significance to the issue of Russian identity, to
enlighten it and to give my own ideas in the work. The most significant part is
to discuss how the idea is constructed, and to analyze those parts of material,
which have been presented. I will try to do a research based on the material,
which can be very useful in creating certain concepts and theories, and I will
later try to explain, why these, or that sources I found the most valuable and
interesting.
I will use a theory testing which is at the center of the
research process. Manheim says that because theories are generally developed
from bits of knowledge about actual relationships, the tasks of theory testing
are essentially those of using the theory to formulate some expectations about
other relationships we have not observed and then checking to see whether
actual relationships we have already observed, because showing that the theory
leads us to expect the very relationships the theory was built to explain
would be no test at all. (Manheim 2002: 25) I will use my research material to analyze
all the distinctive features of my research question, and will try to put them
in order which is will describe all the phenomena of a theory. By doing this, I
will observe all the material which is important in my research question, and
will make conclusions of those parts of my work which will be the most interesting
in categorizing and framing a theory.
Theories, as sets of concepts, assumptions, and propositions,
are never finally proved or disproved (ibid, 2002: 26). Theory elaboration is
based largely on a process of comparing hypothesized conditions with reality
and, once we have results, modifying our theory so that hypotheses that can be
derived from it are more and more consistent with what we observe. (ibid.) I
will have a bunch of considerations in my work, which I will choose to be the
most significant ones, the ones that will reflect my research question, and the
ones that I will consider important. However, I will try to consider those
parts of my work which I will later use for theory elaboration, and I will
compare theories to describe the phenomenon of Russian identity in the real
world.
Selection of an appropriate research
method is critical to success of any research project, and must be driven by
the research question and the state of knowledge in the area being studied. In
general, a combination of research methods may be most effective in achieving a
particular research objective.(Moody 2002) In my work, the most important thing
will be distinguishing, how the theory works, and how it can be used in my
paper to explain phenomenon. The empirical research method in my work will
include the research of materials from books, and Internet. I decided not to do
an interview type of work, because all the generalizations made during the
interviews were already analyzed by scholars before me, and I will present
these views on the basis of their researches. However, I have chosen, in my
opinion, the most significant observations, and views, to be able to describe
the phenomenon of Russian identity from the angle which I find interesting.
In my work, I will use positivism, as well as
interpretivism, or the qualitative approach, is a way to gain insights through
discovering meanings by improving our comprehension of the whole. The
underlying assumption of interpretivism is that the whole needs to be examined
in order to understand a phenomena. Interpretivism is critical of the
positivism because it seeks to collect and analyze data from parts of a
phenomena and, in so doing, positivism can miss important aspects of a
comprehensive understanding of the whole. Interpretivism proposes that there
are multiple realities, not single realities of phenomena, and that these
realities can differ across time and place.
Chapter I. Theoretical
Implications
I.1. Identity in
Constructivism
Constructivism offers alternative
understandings of number of central themes in international relations theory,
including: the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, relationship between
state identity and interest, and prospects for change in world politics.
Constructivism assumes that actors and structures mutually constitute each
other; anarchy must be interpreted to have meaning; state interest are part of
the process of identity construction; power is both material and discursive;
and change in world politics is both possible and difficult (Hopf, 1998:171). For
constructivists there is no “logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that
create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than
another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process.
Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of
anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992:395). Identities are
important, then institutions, balance of power, sovereignty etc. These features
form state’s identity. Constructivism insight that anarchy is what state makes
of it, implies that there are many different understandings of anarchy in the
world. To make an example, in history of Russia, there has always been some
attempts to organise “revolution from above”. Some were successful. This
anarchic type of behaviour inside of state is an example of what Russian state
makes of it.
From constructivist’s point of view,
identities are necessary in international politics in order to ensure some
level of predictability and order. A world without identities is a world of
chaos, a world of uncertainty. Identities perform necessary functions in a
society: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are.
A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, and
reproduces its own identity. (Hopf, 1998:174). The way Russia sees itself in
the world order is a way in which the state is recognised. It plays on the
world stage as a power which has its word to say in the world politics. Identity
of Russia produced during the history has been re-valued and judged by
politicians. Formation of Russian identity on the world scale is state
behaviour. The way it behaves is very important for keeping the world peace and
security. Relations with foreign countries is part of behaviour of Russian
state. From the perspective of Constructivists, Behaviour, Interests and
Identities of the state interact largely with Ideas, Meaning and the Rules in
the context of state system. Therefore, what Russian state produces in the
context of its political and economic system, and which rules and ideas it
applies to the behaviour and interest of state, it forms largely an identity of
Russia.
At the same time, Russian identity has been
formed throughout the years of history and historical change. Russian state
established itself as a strong power, which role in politics was significantly
made-up in history, and gained its continuity in Russian modern state. Russian
identity has been produced via many factors, for example Russian people,
culture, language, historical events, etc. Its great variety of Russian
identity as such has been underlined by historians in Russia and the West.
A state identity is formed in a system of
states. Hopf assumes that constructivism, while expecting to uncover
differences, identities and multiple understandings, still assumes that it can
specify a set of conditions under which one can expect to see one identity or
another (Hopf, 1998). In this respect, I would propose that throughout the
history of Russia, it has formed its behaviour, interests, and actions in the
world. It has gone through many changes. On every phase of change, it has
formed its position, and therefore Russian identity in the world system. For
example, identity of Soviet Union was understood by a Western world as Russia
during the existence of the USSR, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was
trying hard not to have that identity. European identities were incomplete
until they encountered peoples in the Americas and India respectively. The
necessity of difference with an other to produce one’s own identity is
important (Hopf, ibid.). On the other hand, to see the identity of Russia more
clearly, we must look on its place in the world system. To say that it is
Europe, and to choose the way to analyse it from the European perspective, is a
way to get to know Russia in common world system. To see it from different
perspectives, it means to accept that Russia has its own specific roots which
distinguish it from European states. To know that it has deep roots in history
and culture, is to make an understanding of what Russia is itself, to recognise
its own national self-identity.
Constructivism assumes that the selves or
identities of states are a variable; they likely depend on historical,
cultural, political, and social context (Hopf, ibid.) Constructivism proposes a
way of understanding how nationalism, ethnicity, race, gender, religion, and
other intersubjectively understood communities, are each involved in an account
of global politics. In case of Russia, these factors are very broad. Russia is
a multinational state, with the whole variety of ethnicities, religions,
communities, etc. Identity gives Russia its variety and a certain superiority.
An equally important part of the
intersubjective nature of international relations is the operation of actors
within generally accepted patterns for behavior known as norms. Norms define
the context in which the action or decision is being made. In
constructivist model, norms provide definition to the theoretical anarchy
involved in interstate relations and, as reinforced by compliance in action,
will help produce predictability and order particularly between actors whose
identities include shared norms. Understanding of the identity, norms and
context for the other actor or actors involved. Norms provide the
closest approximation to what classical theorists call structure.
Constructivist reasoning accounts for and depends on information and the power
of discourse for validity. Communicated ideas and information largely define
identity. Change in a system of identity and norms can be difficult and slow,
but the rising power and availability of information clearly demonstrates that
change can occur[1].
Russia strictly follows the norms, which states oblige to follow. These norms
are compounds of state norms inside of the country, and they work also on the
international level. They are usually predictable, sometimes not, which
worsens Russian attitude in the world system. These are stable norms, which
every day signify the same and work for the enrichment of Russian state. When
sometimes norms were not followed as in the Soviet Union, Russia has
experienced a full number of sanctions, put on by international institutions.
Therefore, for the last ten years , Russia has been a good follower of
internationally advised rules and was flexible to all restrictions.
Fundamental to constructivism is the proposition that human
beings are social beings, and they are human for social relations. Social
relations make or construct people-ourselves-into the kind of beings that we
are. We make the world that it is.[2](Onuf,
1998: 59) Constructivism holds that people make society, and society makes
people. This is a continuous, two-way process. Social rules make the process by
which people and society constitute each other continuous and reciprocal.
Rules make it possible for us to act on behalf of social constructions. Any
stable pattern of rules, institutions, and unintended consequences gives
society a structure, recognizable as such to any observer.(ibid.: 59) Rules
make agents out of individual human beings by giving them opportunities to act
upon the world. These acts have material and social consequences, some of them
intended and some not.(ibid.: 64) Statements can fully be applied to Russian
state. The number of people who live in Russia is very big, therefore, I may
say that Russian people as well as Russian ethnicities make up the identity of
Russia, as well as society. Russian people have a big say in politics of the
state. Every Presidential elections up to 80 percent of people give their vote
for a new president of Russia, and show respectfully their partly involvement
into the politics of state. People are what makes societies work, and people
create their own politics. Social rules as well as rules on behalf of which
people behave fully depend on the policies of state, and people are the ones
who make this behavior happen. Russia is nowadays a well-structured society, and
all the rules applied to people can be recognized as given in a certain
structure to a mechanism of rule inside of society. These new rules are quite
important in a sense that they bring order to a given society, and they are a
source to avoid chaos.
Institutions make people into agents and constitute
environment within which agents conduct themselves rationally. While it is
always possible, we more commonly think of agents as operationing in an
institutional context that gives them at least some opportunities for choice.
(Onuf; 1998: 61) Institutions such as balance of power, spheres of influence,
and treaties are simple because observers can easily pick them out of an
institutional environment characterized by a large number of linked rules and
related practices. Agents act as observers when they recognize any institutions
as such , no matter how complex it is. Scholars often think of international
regimes as something that they are alone can see, while agents can see only the
simpler institutions making up the regime. International regimes are hard to
see because the rules connecting the institutions that make them up tend to be
informal (ibid: 71). International society is heteronomously ruled because
states exercise their independence under the principle of sovereignty and under
a number of commitment-rules granting them rights and duties with respect to
each other. One state’s independence is a limit on every other’s, and all
states´ agents accept the unintended consequences that result from their
many individual choices. (ibid.: 77) Rules and given to Russia a constitution –
norms, they provide a basis of sovereignty in Russia. Russia acts in the world
on behalf of its democratic system and norms and rules in the society. Anarchy
is a condition of rule in which rules are not directly responsible for the way
agents conduct their relations.(Onuf; 1998: 63) All arguments work in the
modern Russian state. People in Russian state act on behalf of their needs,
and are obliged to follow rules in a society. People recognize institutions,
and the interdependence which they find, is fully recognized by them. Russian
state is an independent state, and its interaction with other states is fully
based on respect of sovereignty. If sovereignty is being broken, one can say
that the state is weak. There has been the age of Russian perestroika, when
anarchy of power was so much in conflict in politics of Russia and people’s
minds. However, this change occurred , and showed its fruitful results in the
new evolving Russian democratic state.
Constructivist position on relation of agents to structures
is that they each constitute the other. Simultaneously, agents and structure
enable and constrain each other. Relation of constructivism to structuration is
complex. Constructivism debt to structuration is plain enough, but the origin
and nature of the differences are important. Rules are central to this process
because they make people active participants in society, and they give any
society its distinctive character (or structure). Rules define agents in terms
of structures, and structures in terms of agents. (Gould; 1998: 80) Agents are,
or consist of individuals whose acts materially affect the world. Rules
constituting a society define the conditions under which individual may
intervene in the world. Rules make individuals into agents by enabling them to
act upon the world in which they find themselves. These acts have material and
social effects; they make the world what is materially and socially.(ibid.: 81)
The rules, due to which Russia lives, are the international rules, which can be
applied to citizens of Russian state. Russia is following international codes
of rules, and applies these rules to the institutions, as well as citizens of
Russia. International rules are difficult to follow, and Russia used to have
some problems, due to the difference in the codes of justice. People are those
who make it all happen. Citizens are the ones to establish their own rules,
and the ones to obey them.
I.2 International
Social Structure
Wendt offers the rival claim that state identity is
endogenous to structured interaction among states. The structural of state
interaction, systemic factors such as interdependence and the transnational
convergence of domestic values, and even the manipulation of symbols in the
strategic practice of rational agents all contribute to the formation of
collective identities.(Gould; 1998: 102) He approaches that the structures of
international politics constrain state behavior; the second argues that
international structures affect both behavior and identity. In our case, it is
both, Russian state is influenced by international structures.
Identity is shaped by structural constrains and incentives.
Such arguments de-emphasize the ways the behavior of agents within structures
shapes identity. It pays less attention than it might to the active role people
and nations play in the fabrication of their own political identities.(Gould;
1998: 103) Constructivism holds that social structure, by itself cannot serve
as the basis for a complete account of identity. Agents and their behavior must
also be considered. Speaking is doing, and constructivists maintain that social
meanings, institutions, and structures are constructed out of practical linguistic
rules.(Kowert; 1998: 104) Here, one should say that people are the ones to
create their own world, and the politicians who make it all happen right. Here,
the agents, people, contribute to state policies by being active agents in
Russian society. Therefore, the agents, people create its own ways within
certain structures, social and political, which shape identity of Russian
state.
State identities are constituted in and through relation to global
economy. However, state identities are neither fixed nor stable and can only be
reproduced through reiterative performances in different terrains. For example,
the identity of an internationalist welfare state can be performed through the
adoption of particular sets of domestic economic policies as against others
(such as emphasizing state planning and the building of a strong public sector
as against a set of policies that favors disinvestment by the state). While
seemingly distinct, practices in these terrains need to be understood as being
part of a larger performance of a particular state identity. (Varadarajan;
2004: 323) Here, we might say that Russia contributes to all before mentioned
issues including a global economy, where it has a certain, not the last one
position. It is a part of G-8, which decides global problems of the world, such
as fight against terrorism and so on. It works on these issues together with
some other states, therefore it is a part of a peace economic dialogue. Russia’s
state’s economic and political attitude is introduced every Summit of G-8, and it’s
state identity, therefore, is showed and not neglected.
Wendt conflates two processes. The constitution of identity
in relation to difference does not mean that the constitution of identity
necessarily involves the agency and discourse of outsiders, but that it
presupposes the existence of alternative identities. A second way in which
liberal constructivists downplay the role of difference in identity
constitution is by arguing that some state identities, such as democratic, are
type identities that involve minimal interaction with ‘others’, and represent
characteristics that are ‘intrinsic to the actors’, such that ‘a state can be
democratic all by itself ’. In this case, Russia has a big stand in the world
politics, and it is an active player. Only ‘role’ identities, such as enemy,
friend, or rival are relational and require the existence of an ‘other’ state.
While it is true that democracy describes a state’s internal system of rule and
all states may become democratic if they fulfill the socially constituted
criteria, democracy as an identity is constituted in relation to difference in
two senses: first, its existence as an identity presupposes the conceptual
possibility of non-democracy. Second, in a world where diverse regimes can
claim to be democracies and the representativeness and accountability of
democratic regimes are internally questioned, the ‘performance’ of a democratic
identity entails the discursive differentiation of the ‘fully’ and ‘truly’
democratic self from the ‘inadequately’ and ‘falsely’ democratic other. (Rumelili;
2004). This exists in Russia’s democracy and state behavior. Russia can be seen
to have several identities, especially when the formation of the state took
place in 1990s. It had its own type of behavior oriented towards newly emerging
states. It saw them partly false democratic. Behavior towards the West was
different. However, nowadays, Russian state has emerged as newly democratic.
Its behavior is to act upon the norms established in the international system,
as well as to preserve its own new democratic state identity. State is forming
its own identity in time in the world. Construction of this identity is quite important
in the world as well for Russia itself, because due to this identity, Russia is
accepted in the world.
International social structure represents relatively stable
and regularized configurations of rules and roles across the international
system (or subsystems). Structures are both regulative and constitutive. They
provide understandings (particular types of information), incentives, and
constraints for certain behavior (thus shaping and shoving action based on a
“logic of consequences”), but also help define (“constitute”) the identities
and interests of actors and establish behavioral norms (thereby contributing to
action based on a “logic of appropriateness” rooted in social roles and rules).
Structure is not a static thing, it is a dynamic product of interaction between
agents (it is constantly being produced, reproduced, and transformed by social
processes). That said, the more stable a given structure is over time, and the
more its components are internalized by agents (that is, treated as “taken for
granted” aspects of an “external objective reality”), the more a structure is
“institutionalized” and the more resistant it will be to change (i.e., the more
it will create “path dependence”). (Rumelili, 2004) Russian state follows
rules and norms in the international system. It also develops its own behavior
on the international level. Its structure brings in itself a particular set of
norms and rules established by state. State is the structure which helps to
provide interaction within the system, and Russian state behaves accordingly to
these rules and provides a framework to an institutionalized community. States
act on behalf of their interests, and provide consequences of their interests.
State preserves its own democratic state identity, and as a result, state
establishes its certain position on the state level.
In sum, for Constructivists, agents and structures are
co-determined or “mutually constituted.” Structures emerge from the
interactions between agents at time “t”, but structures also shape who agents
are and what forms their future interactions will take at time. Thus, according
to Constructivist ontology, agents and structures are always in a process of
becoming[3].
We can notice the interaction between structures and agents, however, is the
basis in interaction put on the level of state rules and state politics. In
case of Russia, people are the ones to choose politicians, and they, therefore
are the ones to follow national and international rules and norms. The
process of making of state identity is, therefore, a result of this
interactions, as well as in the making on the international basis and world system’s
development.
I.3. Constructivism
and World Politics
Constructivism is agnostic about
change in world politics. It restores much variety and difference to world
affairs and points out the practices by which intersubjective order is
maintained, but it does not offer any more hope for change in world politics
than neorealism. Constructivist’s
insight that anarchy is what states make of it, for example, implies that
there are many different understandings of anarchy in the world, and so state
actions should be more varied than only self-help. But this is an observation
of already-existing reality, or, more precisely, a set of hypotheses about the
same. These different understandings of anarchy are still rooted in social
structures, maintained by the power of practice, and quite impervious to
change. What constructivism does
offer is an account of how and where change may occur.(Hopf, 1998)
One aspect of constructivist power
is the power to reproduce, discipline, and police. Alternative actors with
alternative identities,
practices, and sufficient material resources are theoretically capable of
effecting change. Contrary to some critics who assert that constructivism believes that
change in world politics is easy, that "bad" neorealist structures
need only be thought away, in fact constructivism
appreciates the power of structure, if for no other reason then it assumes
that actors reproduce daily their own constraints through ordinary practice. Constructivist’s conceptualization
of the relationship between agency and structure grounds its view that social
change is both possible and difficult. Neorealism's position that all states
are meaningfully identical denies a fair amount of possible change to its
theoretical structure. (Hopf, 1998)
In sum, neorealism and constructivism share fundamental
concerns with the role of structure in world politics, the effects of anarchy
on state behavior, the definition of state interests, the nature of power, and
the prospects for change. They disagree fundamentally, however, on each
concern. Contra neorealism, constructivism
assumes that actors and structures mutually constitute each other; anarchy
must be interpreted to have meaning; state interests are part of the process of
identity construction;
power is both material and discursive; and change in world politics is both
possible and difficult.(Hopf; 1998) It’s a natural process of every state to
change it’s system in time, anarchy in Russian state is seen as a relief from
stagnation, state practices power, and state is the one to follow the change in
internal life of the state. State, therefore, reproduces its nature and rule.
In Russian state, actors have practically made change to happen, and brought visible
change to its structure. Anarchy must be interpreted, in Russian state, to have
meaning and bringing certain results in the process of identity and state
construction. Power, in our case, is discursive, and change is historically
possible, but difficult.
I.4. Identities
and interests
Maja Zehfuss tells that it is the intersubjective, rather
than material aspect of structures which influences behavior. Intersubjective
structures are constituted by collective meanings. Actors acquire identities,
which Wendt defines as ‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and
expectations about self’ (Wendt, 1992: 397; see also Wendt, 1999: 21), by
participating in collective meanings. Identity is ‘a property of international
actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions’ (Wendt, 1999:
224). Thus identities are significant because they provide basis for interests.
Identities are basis for interests and therefore more fundamental (Wendt, 1999:
231). Crucially, conceptions of self and other, and consequently security
interests, develop only in interaction (Wendt, 1992: 401; Wendt, 1999: 36).
Identities and interests are not only created in such
interactions, they are also sustained that way (Wendt, 1999: 331). Through
repeated interactive processes stable identities and expectations about each
other are developed. Thereby actors create and maintain social structures
(Wendt, 1992: 405), which subsequently constrain choices. Once structures of
identity and interests have been created they are not easy to transform because
the social system becomes an objective social fact to the actors. Actors may
have a stake in maintaining stable identities (Wendt, 1992: 411), due to
external factors such as the incentives induced by established institutions and
internal constraints such as commitment to established identities (Wendt, 1999:
339).
I should approve the fact that identities are basis for
interests, and also a fundamental value. They are develop in interaction
between states, between institutions and they are significantly approved to be
a fundamental value when the issue of interaction arose. State produces its
values, and significantly bases their interaction on the the interests of a
particular state, or states, and continues this development and interaction in
time, making formation of states a significant value and a process, connecting
to which, one relies on the existing framework of identities and behaviors of
state. In case of Russian state, its external identity is being viewed as something
dangerous in time, and which significantly slowed down its processes of
interaction between states. Nowadays, when Russian state’s identity has been
changed, Russian state approves to be more open to interactions, however,
foreign states, relying on state behavior produce a framework of interaction
with Russian state. Maintaining stable identities is difficult due to external
factors, and the behaviors of state leads to identity change, is another
paragraph from Wendt. Identity in Russia is being transformed inside of the
countries due to internal political processes, however, on the international
arena, the state identity is being transformed, and Russia doesn’t have a big
value, if it doesn’t change its policies oriented towards foreign states, in
the behaviors of institutions, and political practices. Any change is seen in
the world politics as something new and destructive, therefore, Russia is obliged
to follow international rules to make peace in the country, and fruitful
development of its external and internal interactions.
Actors have several social identities but only one corporate
identity. Social identities can exist only in relation to others and thus
provide a crucial connection for the mutually constitutive relationship between
agents and structures. This type of identity is continuously redefined in
processes of interaction. One of the concrete mechanisms of identity
transformation which Wendt considers is based on conscious efforts to change
identity. As the new behavior affects the partner in interaction, this involves
getting them to behave in a new way as well. This process is not just
about changing behavior but about changing identity. However, behavior is
construed as the key to identity change. The interaction Wendt describes is all
about physical gestures. An advance, a retreat, a brandishing of arms, a laying
down of arms or an attack are the examples Wendt gives for a gesture (Wendt,
1992: 404; Wendt, 1999: 326–35).
Moreover, there is a problem of disentangling identity and behavior
because Wendt claims that it is not just behavior but identity that changes.
Yet it is unclear, with respect to an actual case such as the one considered
here, what exactly sets apart identity transformation from a mere change in behavior.
Although Wendt’s claim that the way in which others treat an seems plausible,
it is hard to pin down the qualitative difference between the two. After all,
in his approach we are forced to infer actors’ self-understanding from nothing
but their behavior. If an identity matters only in its realization in certain
types of behavior, then it is difficult to see what should justify calling it
‘identity’ rather than ‘behavior’. The idea that identities are relatively
stable is certainly of no help as the possibility of identity transformation,
of moving from one kind of anarchy to another, is crucial. Identity change is
merely about shifting from one relatively stable identity to another.[4](Wendt;
1999). The change of the identity of Russian state occurred in the 1990s, and a
new identity is the way Russia behaves nowadays, and the way the world sees it
with own eyes a new Russia state. State identity transformation is quite a
stable process, however, for Russian state it was painful.
I.5. National
Identity
There is no doubt that nations are historical constructs.
They are results of a special European movement and some active nation building
elite. Phrases like “the invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983)
underline this fact. At the same time, nationalist movements have been trying
to establish and argue that there is a history, a culture and a tradition from
which the nations derive. This ambiguity can also be found in the theorizing of
nationalism. The question is to what extent are the nations rooted in a
historical and cultural base, or whether these links are merely created by the
nation builders.
Anthony Smith’s (1983, 1991) theories of nationalism are
based on a so-called ethnie, which denotes the “core” of a nation. This
perception of a common name, ancestry, culture, history and homeland, together
with some sort of solidarity, is a necessary condition for a nation according
to Smith. From this point of view, Russia nation is based on culture of
different ethnics, and these ethnics make a core of a nation. They share the
same homeland, Russia. I would propose that many ethnics throughout history
made a fundament on which Russian state exists now, however, they had nothing
in common, and it has made Russian ethnical background more strong and more
diverse. It is a basis for every state formation to absorb in its territory the
number of people with ethnic principles, and therefore, to bring people into
one nation. From this perspective, Russian state is a multiethnic state with
common national identity and identity of Russian people.
Benedict Anderson’s (1991) theory is superior to Smith’s,
especially “on the workings of an existing community”, because it is concerned
with identity as a process. It is not restricted to one special
historical happening (the rise of nations), but it tries to give a more general
picture of how a group of people continuously experiences its common identity.
His expression “imagined communities” underlies one important feature, namely
the on-going process. People have to imagine a community, a society, or
a common identity, for it to be real. It does not exist unless people think so,
unless they feel some sort of solidarity with people they never have met.
In Christopher J. Ullock’s (1996) words, Anderson’s approach
is based on “a metaphysics of becoming” (as opposed to a “metaphysics of
being”), something that makes his theory dynamic. It focuses on the process of
identity formations and is not limited to its historical origins. This makes
the theory more generally applicable, both to kinds of collective identities
other than states and to nationalist movements outside Europe which have a
totally different historical background.
Russian national identity is based on the hundreds years of
history. Historically, it was based on some values, which don’t go in
contradiction with before– mentioned principles, for example, with a view that
nations are historical constructs, or that nation has a core. This core is a
stable value, and it significantly reflects the state fundamental principles,
as well as it significantly reflects nation- state structure, which is mainly
developed due to historical processes inside of the country. Nowadays, national
identity in Russia is a matter of discourses and analysis. Politicians have their
own view on national idea of state. People follow common thinking, or the
ideology of state, or, nowadays, its basic values, which reflect specifics of
Russian state which is different from the rest of the states. However, national
identity is a matter, a fundament of state identity, and its core is in the
attitudes, ideology, behavior of state, etc. which people construct themselves,
and which state follows historically, or basing its behavior on international
rules and norms. National idea is a matter of disputes, and its value is to
understand Russia as a state, as an entity, as a certain state with specific mentality.
National identity is based on these factors, on the core, on history and
ideology, and people are the ones who decide about the idea of state and its
national identity. In consideration to international practices, Russian state
is being viewed as a national power, which certainly is a result of state
practices in time.
I.6. Identity
as Process
Identity is not something that just is; it can rather be
described as a process. Collective identities are never stable and
objective but always in-the-making. They are subjectively experienced and
expressed, a result of social communication and perceptions of Self and Others.
A basic insight in all identity theory is the importance of the Other. As a
problem in my work, I significantly highlight the issue of identity formation
as a process in time, as well as it is a matter of interaction between agents
and their attitudes. Their attitudes are expressed in the behavior of states.
It is a source of communication of states and their interests. As for the
Other, I mention that Russian state is shaped in politics by the behavior of
other states.
This is a classic insight from Fredrik Barth (1969:10) who
argued that ethnic identities were a result of communication with other groups:
“...ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and
acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which
embracing social systems are built.” Identities are always a result of
communication; they are relational. Those who do not fit into the definitions
of the Self are different and may also be excluded, estranged or alienated.
They may even be securitized and become enemies. This way the securitization
also functions as an identity building process. The Others are securitized
because they are considered to represent symbols and values that are
incommensurable or threatening to those of the Self-group. This approach does
not neglect historical traits (like language, culture and so on). But as long
as these have to be interpreted and represented through subjects and through
subjective experiences and language, they are subjective social constructs. Here,
the most important is the meaning of the Other and state identity.
Communication on this level bring in itself the matters of social
constructions and interests. States due to their interests are having their
interests to act on behalf of them. States are important agents in protecting
their identities.
To conclude before-mentioned issues in
the work, I will introduce you to my view on Russian identity in the context of
constructionists. The main accent is made on state identity formation, and
reflects, at some points, issues, which were previously discussed in
theoretical part of the work, and which conclude my own ideas on the work, and
which give a feedback to the second part of the work in which I will discuss
the opinions of Russia and Western scholars, and Russian politicians, which
show different opinions on how the identity of Russia is constructed, what are
the main priorities in the identity of Russian state, and which show different
views on how Russia is being made throughout history and nowadays.
I.7. Concluding theories
National identity as part of Russian identity is a basis of
construction of Russian state. Without ideology of state construction, without
orientation on the international jurisdictional norms, without its
self-definition in the world arena, without connection with the system factors
of civilization, without definition of principles and priorities of the state
formation there cannot be self-definition of Russia as state, and therefore,
its definition of identity. Formation, or construction, of identity depends on
the maturity of society, its ideology and social consciousness of the nation.
State as political organization of the society has several factors: existence
of the system of institutions, as well as institutions, which make functions of
governmental power, law, which strengthens defined system of norms, defined
territory, on which the existing system of norms is spread. However, the
institution of state-building is based on the values, which define the
identity of nation.
The main values of Russian state is considered to be its
history, culture, national language, and Orthodoxy. On the basis of historical
development, the identity of Russia is built. By the formation of consciousness
of nation, by creation of ideology, the ideological identity of Russia is being
made. Formation of the identity of nation can be seen in the context of historical
development of state.
If we look on the identity as a process, through which the
state is being formed, we should look on the processes inside of the country.
These are the changing nature of political and economical institutions, which
gain its development in quickly changing nature of state, its policies oriented
on the formation of state as an entity, etc. On the world arena, these factors
are a multipolarity of political world, quickly changing world system,
integration processes, communicability. These factors which influence the
identity of Russia.
Identity of Russia was for most part is formed by Russian
intelligentsia. Trustful relationship of intelligentsia as part of a society
has build up people of different epochs of Russian historical development.
Culture, as historically defined factor of development of nation, has gained
its development in spiritual values of Russian state. That’s why, wide entity
of Russia is by many means defines the identity of nation, as well as proved
its value in the creation of Russian identity in the process of historical
development of nation. This process is changing, developing and dynamic. Besides,
the factors such as economical and political institutions which change its
nature in the process of state formation can be said to promote the process of
construction of state identity.
Religion, as one of the forms of social consciousness, and
spiritual values, form the identity of a nation, as well as it influences the
process of the identity formation. Russia is a multiconfessional state,
however, one of the forms of religious consciousness is being an Orthodoxy.
Russian Orthodoxy has difficult history. Officially, the Church is separated
from the state. Nevertheless, spiritual values and social consciousness of part
of a nation is formed under the influence of Orthodoxy, which reflects in the
identity of Russia.
Identity, as a final result of state formation,
self-definition of state, is important for perceptance of Russian state on the
international level. Contacts, and intercommunication with the state is fully
dependent on state identity.
Identity is at first, is formed inside of the country.
However, in the last decade, there arose a tendency of influence of the other
countries on the identity of the nation. For example, on the identity of Russia
the post-Soviet countries are being influenced, as well as there can be notice
an influence of such states as European states, USA, China, India, Japan.
Russia tries to influence political formation of post- Soviet states, builds
new forms of economical networks and structures. This all influence politics in
Russia, and builds Russian identity.
Russia, as a part of world institutions, the UN, etc., is in
the active international political life. Therefore, Russia is a part of
international law. It follows the norms of international justice, and builds
its relations with the EU, on the basis of international justice, and codes of
jurisprudence. The basis of this cooperation is international relations,
international jurisdictional norms and treaties. Regulation of relations
between states is being made due to special norms, approved in treaties, which can
be changed, but which fully depend on the dynamics of the processes and
regulations. New norms, and changing world influences Russian identity, as
state. It is formed inside of the state, and also on the basis of international
law and legal basis of international relations.
Chapter II. Views on identity of Russia
II.1. View on history of
Russian Identity by Iver B. Neumann
To have a closer look on the history of
Russia, I will introduce you to the book of Iver B. Neumann, “Russia and
the Idea of Europe”, 1996. He gives a summary of historical formation of
Russian identity from the 18th century up until the end of
Perestroika and overview of the views of famous historians and politicians.
Neumann stresses that formation of Russian identity was formed throughout the
history of Russia with close comparison between European identity, European
institutions, culture and interactions between European and Russian states.
Identity of Russia has been formed during all the historical
process. According to Neumann, Russia has been trying to relate itself to
Europe from the 18 century, but “different perceptions of Europe made it
impossible to forge a common Russian identity… Some looked to the East, others
to the West” (Neumann, 1996:10). This contradiction exist nowadays, as there is
no final decision of where does Russia belong? Ones would say that it is a part
of Europe, another would say that because of geographical reasons, it doesn’t
fully belong to Europe, because the main part of the country is in Asia. Some
would say that it is Eurasia.
Russia has been developed a lot in the 18th century. It has
become a strong European power during the rule of Peter the Great. The identity
became stronger and clearer, as the contacts with Europe intensified and Russia
has become more opened. From that time, it can be said that Russia has put an
eye on Europe in terms of development, technologies, economy and politics.
Then, it has received a lot of attention from Europe. Then, it has been a
strong and powerful European power in terms of trade, etc. Its identity was a
strong economic and political power. It was said that Russia belongs to Europe,
and new forms of relations were created then. This identity was so strong as it
could stand together with Europe for many years to come.
At the same time, the idea of using Urals as a border line to
separate its European and Asian parts was proposed by geographer and the first
significant Russian historian Vasily N. Tatishev in 1730s (Neumann 1996:12). Up
until now, Russia has a separation to European and Asian parts geographically,
demographically and economically.
From the beginning of the 19th century,
thinkers and officials like Karamzin, Speransky and others look to Europe for
ideas to improve Russian political order. Karamzin, another great Russian
historian, argued that they are actually weakening Russia, since it is
dangerous to tamper with ancient political structures. At the same time,
Karamzin saw Russian uniqueness and isolation as something positive. He saw a
specific character of Russian state (Neumann 1996, 15).
In 1830s the change of positions happened in
the political space. Romantic nationalists gathered under the banner of
“Slavophilism”, and those who looked to Europe for political and economic
models become known as Westernisers (ibid: 29). The task of Westernisers had
set themselves was to show how Russia was already developing along European
lines and how it should try to accelerate that development (ibid:35).
Slavophiles saw the contemporary Russian state as an extension of this alien
principle into the organic body of the Russian nation. European influence to
them was Otherness from which Russia must be saved (ibid:33). The official
ideology was represented by minister Uvarov, who proclaimed what was to become
known as the doctrine of “official nationality”. The three pillars which were
to define official Russia were autocracy (samoderzhavie), Orthodox
religion (pravoslavie) and nationality or nation-mindedness (narodnost`)
(ibid: 25).
This contradiction between Slavophiles and
Westernisers was of great importance and great meaning as for it was a way to
see Russia so different already then, when it was choosing it’s own way to go.
This argument had deep roots in history and in common understanding by people
and theoreticians. Some saw it as a European power, the others as a great
Russian power. This contradiction has its continuum nowadays, as for people see
Russia differently.
During the First World War the question of the relative
importance of national and class identities became important, as well as
interdependence of Russia with Western Europe. Even between the members of the
same political party, for example Bolsheviks, there was no a common point of
view on the question: where Trotsky holds that the idea of a Fatherland has no
appeal to the European proletariat, Bukharin acknowledges it as a potent force
and Lenin stresses the importance of a nation-state (Neumann 1996).
To understand that this new change after the October
revolution 1917 in Russia was destructive is to understand the history of
Russia then. The Soviet Republic was said to exist for a long period side by
side with imperialist states, and to keep good contacts with Europe, still
Russia lacked its own position, and lost many of its contacts. Europe became
suspicious of Russia, of a country which lost some part of its strong identity.
It hasn’t get the one in the years to come. It was a new Russia, called Soviet
Union, for some seventy years. An attempt to reborn Russian identity in
contradiction to Soviet identity was made in 1990s by wide anti-communist
opposition including democrats, nationalists and former Soviet officials like
Yeltsin, and was made successfully.
After the Second World War, state identities
of the Soviet Union, Western Europe and the United States, each rooted in
domestic socio-cultural milieus, produced understandings of one another based
on differences in identity and practice. The United States balanced against
Russia because of the latter’s communist identity. The United States understood
the Soviet threat, as communist, and itself as the anticommunist protector
(Hopf, 1998:180). Self-identity of the Soviet Union then was defined as a
fighter against imperialism, leaded by the United States. Both states had
nuclear weapons and strong political power. The context to understand Russia
after the Second World War has changed dramatically. It became so different
from what it was. The Soviet Union has become a superpower, and an identity of
Russia was seen from that perspective. Identity of Russia was formed from its
victory in the war, and has put an impact on the self-definition of the state.
In the beginning of 1980s, A. Solzhenitsyn
wrote that Russia is morally superior to West European nations, and everybody
is responsible for everything, everywhere. Academician D. S. Likhachev
concludes that patriotism is indeed a necessity, since “ we are all citizens of
our people, citizens of our great Union and citizens of the Earth” (Neumann
1996:147). Again, this period can be marked as a revaluation of values in the
Soviet state, of what Russia is and what it will be. These were an attempts to
recover a liberal position of Russia in the world. These liberal views
specified in context of the direct assessment of the Western liberal
intelligentsia. The Westernisation of Russia was proposed later by Sakharov,
and a cooperation with Europe was proposed by Likhachev. Neumann comments this,
as the Russia’s position on the West has changed, as well as on the capitalist
system. The public political space has enlargened, and the Russian debate about
Europe with dynamism has reappeared (Neumann 1996:157).
Later on, the relations with Europe were
characterised as isolationist. It was stated by Novikov. And there was a need
to re-impose them. Novikov came up with the slogan of “Eurasia”. Europe and
Russian Westernisers again tried to Europeanise Russia (Neumann 1996: 177).
Russia which we see nowadays is heading towards Europeanization, and Europe
which we see nowadays is highly interested in Russia-European relations.
II.2. Historical formation of Russian
identity
II.2.1. The view of Russian scholars
Identity was
formed both internally by the consolidation of religion, the church, and
eventually by a single Muscovite state (from roughly the fifteenth century),
and at the frontiers in the struggles with peoples seen to be different. From
its beginning, then, Russian identity was bound up with the supranational world
of belief, the political world loosely defined by the ruling dynasty, and was
contrasted to “others” at the periphery. Religion served in those pre- and
early-modern times much as ethnicity does today. Agadjanian says that if not
from the very beginning, then in the next few centuries Russian identity became
closely tied with religion, a shifting, expanding territory, and the state.[5]
Nicholas V.Riasanovsky in his book
“Russian Identities. A Historical Survey” says that in Kievan Russia the
political system was certainly pluralistic and to an extent even populist and
democratic (Riasanovsky 2005 :19), that the conversion of the Rus of the Greek
form of Christianity brought with it the highly developed Byzantine culture,
that the new Church was one of the entire state, and at least after 1037, it
was subordinate to the patriarch of Constantinople and headed by a metropolitan
of Kiev, although Novgorod and some other town also became religious centers.
The Kievan state was the state of the East Slavs. It was also a European state.
Christian identity of Kievan Russia and Kievan Russians was of course fully
explicit. From the victorious and glorious account of the conversion of the Rus
in the Primary Chronicle, Christianity stood out as the truth, the right, and
the one sure guide for Russia and the Russian people. (ibid.:22) Russian
identity during some hundred years between the decline and fall of the Kievan
state and the accession to the throne of Peter the Great survived many things,
but Orthodox Christianity remained basic to the Russian identity, not unlike
Roman Catholicism in medieval Western and Central Europe (ibid.: 49-50). In
Medieval Russia, as in medieval Europe as a whole, intellectual life centered
on religious problems, although their ramifications often encompassed other
areas of human activity. (ibid. : 53) The Reign of Peter that Great was
significant because of the engagement of Muscovy with Sweden, Poland and
Turkey. Russia created an impressive navy. Peter the Great changed the
government institutions and th entire administrative apparatus of Muscovite
Russia. Intellectual climate constituted the leading inspiration of the age.
(ibid. : 76) The identity prevailed significantly and constituted Russia as a
significant European state. During the Reign of Nicholas I, 1825-1855, the
issue of Russian identity was again on the surface. Russia experienced two
intellectual transformations, the change from the ideology of the Age of
Reason, to Romanticism and Idealism, and the disintegration of the new
worldview. (ibid. : 165)
In the Soviet Russia, 1917-1991, the
issue of Russian nationalism as part of Soviet ideology is worth to be
mentioned. Russian nationalism became more direct in the years of the World War
II. The Orthodox Church obtained a patriarch, strengthened its organization,
and in general made a certain recovery after what have been one of the most
devastating religious persecutions in World history.(ibid. : 219) In foreign
policy, the Soviet Union and its East European satellites continued to confront
the US and its allies. Most of the world came to be divided between the two
camps. The confrontation was a most impressive and lasting demonstration of the
mobilized might and hostility of the two sides. (ibid. : 221) The Soviet Union
came to be divided into 15 union republics and over a hundred smaller
subdivisions based on the Ethnic principle. (ibid.: 222)
II.2.2 The view of Western scholars
John O'Loughlin and Paul F. Talbot talk
about Soviet Union. The end as a unified territory and the effect that this
disintegration had on the geopolitical imaginations of Russian people. Russian
people unlike other post-communist states, which returned to a pre-communist
past for symbols of its national identity, Russia faced a crises of identity.
The search for a new traditional identity has been ongoing in Russia since
1991, becoming a centerpiece of Putin strategy to resurcate state authority in
the wake of Yeltsin years in the Kremlin. Russia has been questioning the
national identity. Ordinary Russians sense of national identity has influenced
public opinion. The collapse of the Soviet Union generated new mental maps for
Russians.(Loughlin and Talbot, 2005: 26) Sparked by NATO expansion, questions
of great power conflict, territorial control and influence, and national
identity have once again become part of the agenda. Visions of ordinary
Russians is based on aspects of identity formation that are rooted in
territory. It is a map that shows Russia as a specific territory that does not
include the other republics of the former Soviet Union.(ibid. : 28)
If we turn to Graham Smith, who said
that Russia has undergone a significant shift in foreign policy since 1993, and
reformulation of Russia’s foreign policy reflects a more systemic crises of
national identity. The place ascribed to Russia within global affairs has
become scripted as part of an explicitly geopolitical discourse based on
competing representations of Russia bound up with the idea of Eurasia. Based on
the notion that Russia should follow its distinctive societal and geopolitical
path separately from Europe an the West, its distinctiveness as part of
Eurasian civilization constituting a geopolitical bridge between Europe and
Asia or simply an alternative to both. The idea of Russia becoming an equal
partner of the West was rapidly inscribed in official government discourse.
(Smith, 1999: 481) George Schopflin in “Identities, Politics and Post-Communism
in Central Europe” says that Identity offers a rationality of its own that
neither a universalistic nor a particularistic perspective satisfactorily
resolves these problems.(Schopflin, 2003: 479)
II.2.3. The view of Russian Politicians
For all this discussed previously, I can say that there was
throughout a history of Russia, a struggle for Russian identity. There were
many successful attempts to give Russia its own character, and its own values.
It was an important thing. To turn to the identity of Russia nowadays, I will
introduce you to Russian political thinking, and will introduce you to the
views of Russian politicians. For example, Kazarkin, in his observation
of history in conjunction to identity formation nowadays, says that:
“I would talk
about how Russia has evolved in a number of spatial settings, from the great
expanse of the nation as a whole, to the region, and to the home
(prostranstvenno, regional’no, domashne). First, how Russia was formed
(sozdavalas’) region by region: Kievan Rus, the northern forested regions, the
area along the Volga and the Don, the Urals, and Siberia. During the Soviet
period, research and publishing on local history (kraevedenie) was pretty much
curtailed, and this tradition has to be restored as we create a new patriotic
consciousness, which has to be a living thing. Religion is important, and
Russian Orthodoxy definitely falls within the boundaries of this identity.
Paganism was also a factor but not as the state religion of a unified Rus, so
there was no such thing as “Pagan Rus’” (iazycheskaia Rus’) but the pagan
beliefs of a number of tribes which varied from region to region. For the past thousand
years, Orthodoxy has played a key role in the history of our state and the
identity of its inhabitants. We can’t talk about Russia as being something
united only by a common language–that wouldn’t be enough to make us a people.
And when we talk about the Russian character, of course we have to bring in
Russian literature in the broadest sense, the Russian classics. Literature can
still be seen as something that holds the nation together (derzhit natsiiu),
that appreciates our national identity[6].
For sure, his view on identity is alike the common existing
in Russia view. This view underlines the existing Russian state as an entity,
and develops the common view on history of Russia, as well as on the main
characteristics of Russian state. It distinguishes a unique Russian nature of
state, which is build up in conjunction with history of Russia, and it promotes
common features equal to existing values of the state. This is a general
existing view on the problem. To look deeper on the topic, one should pay
attention to another politician, Chubais.
Chubais says: ...
Russia is experiencing a polysystemic crisis. If the most acute (samyi ostryi)
crisis is economic, then the deepest crisis is over ideas and identity. We
aren’t sure who we are and what our identity is, and until we can do that we
won’t be able to solve any of our other problems. Some people insist that there
is no crisis. Others say that the crisis arose only in 1996, when President
Yeltsin announced that we needed a new national idea. A third group says that
the crisis arose in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed (kogda rukhnul
Sovetskii Soiuz).
I’m convinced that the crisis arose towards the end of the
19th century. Dostoevsky, Berdyaev, Solovyev and other powerful Russian
thinkers. . . .wrote extensively about Russian national identity. What kind of
crisis was this? And what kind of identity do we have? We can only answer this
question when we take into account that we are talking about a process, a
dynamic process. . . . We have to talk about what has taken place, what are the
tendencies and the lines [of development].
At the end of the 19th century we had a crisis of ideas. .
. . Russian identity was built around three principles, three fundamental
values: Orthodoxy, imperial policies such as the expansion of the nation’s
territory, and peasant collectivism (obshchinnyi kollektivizm). All three
principles were unstable (shatalis’) at the end of the 19th century. The
expansion of land had exhausted itself and come to an end (ischerpalo), as it
reached natural limits in the south. Western expansion was pretty much finished
by the end of the 18th century. Orthodoxy, like all Christianity, was in the
midst of a crisis. Nietzsche wrote about this in Europe and Dostoevsky wrote
about it in Russia. And with Orthodoxy in a crisis all sorts of phenomena began
to appear–nihilists, terrorists, bomb-throwers (nigilisty, terroristy,
bombisty, vse eti -isty), all these types who caused problems for Russia. And
the third element, peasant collectivism, was also in a crisis. As a result of
the Stolypin reforms the peasants were leaving the commune (obshchina), and it
began to dissolve as a social structure and as a social community (obshchnost’)[7].
I would propose that Chubais is giving another view on the
problem. However, in his comments, there are, for most part, interesting ideas
on the topic. One should say that it´s quite a broad and problematic
description of the issue, which explains crisis of ideas in a society. However,
his ideas are based on history of the problem, and ideologically constructed
issues are a matter of the deep and broad thinking of a politician.
Another
politician in Russia, Kara-Murza, says that: …. what it is that makes
Russia possible, what held it together?. . . . I think that there are three
forms of integration that hold the community (obshchnost’, sotsium) together:
(1) As an ethnocracy (etnokratiia), where the ethnic sign
has a unifying power. . . .
(2) The second way is through state service, through a
vertical status hierarchy….
(3) The third principle is more contemporary. It’s a
horizontal integration through the reconfiguring (obustroistvo) of territories
and cultures, based on the principle of the nation-state (politicheskaia
natsiia). On the one hand, it’s half-ethnic, because the nation is partly an
ethnic construct. On the other hand, the nation is built to a significant
degree on horizontal ties, while the imperial principle involves a vertical
structure. These three principles are of course not mutually exclusive, but at
any given moment, one will dominate.
Here,
Kara-Murza touches upon the issue of nation-state and defines the building
blocks, or its compounds of the state. To be correct in defining these
principles, he is using the theory of nation-state, which also can be used in
defining a political identity of Russia. Here, we face an interesting statement
that integration of the community can include three main principles. I would
propose that Kara-Murza explains certain trends in the nation-state formation,
and proposes fruiful arguments about political structure of the state,
therefore, explaining Russian state identity.
Chubais correctly
names the three identity principles that, when taken together, made Russia
possible before the Revolution: Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality. Which is
the most important? Religious theoreticians, at least the liberal ones, all
agree that while the wish was for the principles of Orthodoxy and Orthodox
communities (pravoslavnye obshchiny) to guide the nation, in practice it is the
imperial principle that has been decisive. It subordinated the church to
itself, made the church part of the state (ogosudarstvil tserkov’).
The imperial principle dominated, and it was Peter who made
this happen. He brought communal structures into the table of ranks,
subordinating them to the interests of the empire. And I think that Chubais is
right that Communist identity recreated these structures: instead of Orthodoxy
there was Communism, instead of the imperial table of ranks there was the
hierarchy of Party committees, and the new Soviet collectivism took a variety
of forms. What I can’t say is how one can call this a violation of Russian
tradition–it was a continuation of Russian (rossiiskii) tradition. These
traditions were winding down, and the Bolsheviks had to use force to maintain
this old imperial logic. Andropov and Stalin to an extent modeled themselves on
Peter the Great. Whether they did this intentionally or not, they worked in
similar ways[8].
Here, one might say that Chubais underlines three main
principles of Russian identity: Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality, giving
personal views on the issue. However, in my work, I don´t define
Autocracy and Nationality as main principles, that would argue with my whole
work argumentation. On the other hand, Chubais is said to reflect the interests
of Oligarchs in Russia. That makes his comments rather interesting from the
point of view of a researcher, who is interested in many of different views on
the issue.
Kara-Murza
says: We’ve talked about internal
identity, self-identity (samoidentichnost’) and ways in which Russia has not
completely worked this out. Now we are talking about external identity
(vneshniaia identichnost’), Russia on the outside (Rossiia vovne), how the
country positions itself in the international sphere. The conflicting, mutually
exclusive conceptions of how to describe the present situation belong to three
basic groups.
(1) The first idea is that Russia is Europe, that it
is genetically descended from Christian civilization, albeit in its Eastern
variant, so it’s Eastern Europe. Variants of this idea see Russia as a Europe
that is underdeveloped (nedorazvitaia), sick (bol’naia), failed
(neudavshaiasia), or just-born-but-already-corrupted (tol’ko nachavshaiasia
rozhdat’sia no uzhe isporchennaia). There is also the belief that Russia is the
best Europe (luchshaia Evropa), to use an expression coined by Georgii Fedotov
..., the idea that Russia is Europe is the one that I agree with.
(2) The second idea is that Russia is Eurasia, and
in this sense, a Eurasia in opposition to Europe. Lev Gumilev believed that in
a certain sense the Russian and Turkic peoples complemented each other, that
the Russians were simultaneously Slavic and Turkic. From this you get
neo-Eurasians, the interest in Chingiz Khan as part of the Russian genetic
constitution (genotip), the opposition of Eurasia and Europe. In this
conception, Christianity doesn’t play much of a role. . . .
(3) The third idea is one that comes from the early
Slavophiles and can be traced from there to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Russia
is neither West nor East, Russia is the North, the idea of the northernness
(severianstvo) of Russia. Russia is not Europe, but it also has no relationship
of any kind to Asia. Russia is the North, it is Orthodox, directly in
opposition to Europeanness with its Latin confession, and to Islam.
These are three powerful conceptions, existing in
opposition to each other, with little in common. While there are moments in
history when they were brought together by (za schet) the imperial idea, they
could only be united through force (nasil’stvennym sposobom). . . . How could
you harmonize these identities in a non-coercive way? I completely agree with
Professor Aksiuchits that this country is Christian at its base (po genotipu),
but in the 20th century there are massive problems of a culturological nature.
Judging by the classic theoretical works, civilizations are formed on the basis
of one religion (tsivilizatsii konstatiruiutsia bazovoi religiei), which some
call the sacred vertical (sakral’nyi vertikal).
. . . Russia is a country with a dual identity (dual’naia
identichnost’) in its culture, civilization, and geopolitics. In the sense of
culture and civilization it is undeniably European. It is the Eastern Orthodox
variant, standing in contrast, even in opposition, to Catholic Western Europe,
but this is still all within the European context.
Geopolitically, we are Eurasia. This gets confused all the
time. The intelligentsia likes to say that we are completely European, and
whatever they can’t fit into that picture is deemed unnecessary. This is a
dangerous delusion (zabluzhdenie) of the intelligentsia consciousness. The
contradiction between cultural and geopolitical identities matches to a large
extent the difference between the intelligentsia and the regime. . . . They
want to be civilized, like Europe. I wouldn’t say we have a geopolitical
mission, but we find ourselves on a geopolitical landscape. Russia has a mission
to hold onto that expanse and protect it from chaos. But to expand this
geopolitical idea to the cultural realm is wrong. Not only did the
intelligentsia try to substitute their own idea of culture for conceptions of
power, but the geopolitical imperatives, the holding on to power and land,
often expanded to the idea of culture, suppressing it. That’s why the
Western-oriented intelligentsia so often was cut down (vyrezalas’) during the
cruel totalitarian years, both in the tsarist and Soviet eras. The search for
harmony between the European cultural and Eurasian geopolitical identities is
one of the most complex tasks that faces a Russia in search of unity. An
analysis, a diagnosis, is the first step[9].
. . .
Kara-Murza reflects thoughts of intelligentsia in Russia. The
question of the status of development in Russia, its position in modern world
till this time was very difficult to handle. Why? Truly, Russia is a big
territorial state, which is situated between Europe and Asia, besides, a big
part of territory is in the North of Russia, with its ethnos and peoples.
However, not looking at its big territories, big part of people is in the
European part. In all historical times, politics of state was defined in Moscow
or Saint Petersburg. Besides, there was a big influence of European states. All
this defined the development of Russia as a civilization, oriented on Europe. That’s
why, I consider that Russia, for most part is close to Europe, and will agree
with a thesis that Russia is Europe, is Eurasia. Modern development of Europe
also shows that it is oriented more on Europe than on Asia.
Chubais: In determining whether Russia is Europe or Asia, a lot
depends on the methodology used. If we say that the basis (osnova) of Russian
(rossiiskii) identity is ethnically Russian (russkii), then we will get one
type of answer. If we see religion as the foundation, then we will arrive at a
different solution. As we look at geopolitical space, we’ll get a third
variant. So the methodology, and what we choose as our fundamental element, are
all-important. . . . This identity question is something that will be decided
by society and not by the political elite, which will make a mistake if it
doesn’t listen to what society wants.
On the question of determining Russia’s place in the
world–as European, Asian, or Eurasian, or some other variant–the Europe/Asia
dilemma is too narrowly stated and doesn’t work (ne srabatyvaet)–the result is
always a state of vague disagreement. The question is broader than that and needs
to be looked at less theoretically and more practically. Russia can and must
feel at home (svoi) in Europe, and can come to an understanding of its position
in Asia–that is what our forefathers did as they moved on from here to Alaska[10].
Chugrov: We have to find a balance. In the Russian mentality there
is a sense of inner conflict and contradiction. I fully agree with those who
call Russia a torn country (razorvannaia strana). If we choose to talk about
identity as a subjective and dynamic category, then we have to ask people how
they feel and how they want to feel in the future, what kind of life they want
for Russia. More than 90% say they want it to be like it is in the West.
Russians don’t want to live in a place like Iran or Pakistan, or–despite our
better relations with these countries–like people in China or India.
. . . Russia is Europe in its self-consciousness, but with
its own original profile. But this can give rise to serious conflict. The West,
seeing itself as a model for Russia, relates to it like a sister, not as if it
is a foreign element . . . but like a person acts towards a relative. And we
know that you make more demands of a relative than of a stranger to whom you
can smile politely–that is the basis of the criticism that the West makes of
Russia. A culturally closer Russia irritates the West more than a distant China
or India, and Russia ought to understand this. For decades, the West feared a
nuclear attack, and this left its psychological traces. When this danger passed
and the situation changed completely, first there were benevolent feelings and
then disillusionment, more or less as we felt towards them. . . . The West’s
fear of Russia is a legacy of the Communist past.
How should Russia act? I don’t think that Russia should
choose an orientation either towards the West or towards the East. We should
act in an ad hoc way in each situation, according to our national interests and
the internal problems we are trying to solve. We should have close, friendly
relations with the United States, but not try to please (ponravit’sia) or charm
the West. If Russia acts according to this principle, I think that in a couple
of decades it will once again be a great power (velikaia derzhava), and it
won’t have been achieved artificially, but in a natural way[11].
However, I agree with a view of Chugrov, who sees Russia as
an independent state, not oriented on interests of only West, or only East, but
a state, oriented on political interests on the West, and on the East. From my
view, Russia cannot be a boat which has lost its orientation, standing on one
place, and trying to find its way out. In my opinion, Russia, for most part,
should take a course on the West, on contacts with the USA, and Europe.
To conclude this chapter, I should notice the difference in perception
of Russian identity by different scholars. Western scholars write that identity
of Russia is based on the years of history and historical change. This view is
quite common. Truly, a state is nothing without history. All the historical
events make up the basis for state formation, and significantly define state in
the world politics. For Russian scholars, identity formation is mostly a
process, based on history of Russia, as well as on the internal factors, such
as nation-state formation. National identity is viewed by them as a
significantly most important factor is state formation, and state is seen as a
permanent value which develops in time. Politicians nowadays reflect the views
of Russia on Russian identity. There is an idea in Russian intelligentsia, that
Russia is a part of Europe, and on the other hand, that it is an independent
entity which has its own way in history of Russia, and therefore its own
national identity. However, these views are a part of ideological process in
the identity formation, and these values are a historically made up principles
which reflect people’s minds and their common ideas. Main ideological thinking
about fate of Russia started to exist from long ago. They reflected ideas about
common Russian soil, Motherland, Russian soul, Russian state behavior, etc. To
make an observation of these main ideologies, I will move you to the next
chapter, about ideologies of Russia, and later, to a theory of civilizations,
after which I will give you my own view on the problem.
II.3. Main ideologies in history of Russia
Since the times of Peter the Great in
minds of Russian Intelligentsia were two ideas: Russia as a Great European
Might, and European Civilization. For the first ones, the most important was
Russia as a great European Might. These were the representatives of
governmental reaction. For the others, the most important were the ideas of
progressive European civilization. They said: at any price let us implement the
ideals of European civilization in Russia, and make Russia a progressive
European state. These were the representatives of radical- progressive society.
The tragedy was in the fact that not the first, neither the second direction
judging the Russian conditions of living, couldn’t be completely implemented.
Every of the two sides noticed internal disagreement of the other, but couldn’t
see that it also had the same negative sides. Reactioners understood that to
let to go half-wild Russian democracy, progressionism at their side will shaken
the existence in Russia of European democracy. Progressists, from their side
said that to save Russia in the concert of Great European states, Russia has to
make it until the level of European states in foreign politics. These ideas
were born after Peter the Great reforms. Russian people were far away from
understanding of these ideas. (Savitskiy, 1925: 99) In later times, there
appeared an absolute change in before existing ideas. The new ideology of
Eurasianism was in big difference with before existing theories, provoking
itself many contradictions with political considerations of old directions.
(Savitskiy,1925:100) Eurasianism regreted an authority of European culture.
Making Russian national culture a main cultural might, Eurasianism goes after
the whole Petrovian, Saint- Patersburg, Imperator period of Russian history.(
Savitskiy, 1925:101) A negative view on Imperator Russia and underlined
existence of peoples culture was important.( Savitskiy, 1925: 102) Eurasianism
comes to national Russian culture without a will to change it with any of
Romano-German forms of life. It underlines a real independent national
development. (Savitskiy, 1925: 103) Besides, Eurasianism stands on the ground
of Orthodoxy, making it the only Christian religion and especially underlines
the only true Orthodoxy as Russian artistic stimuli[12].(
Savitskiy, 1925:104)
However, Europeanization was not a
natural process of forming Russian state, the reforms of Peter the Great were
said to change it to the unnatural change towards Europeanization of Russian
culture[13].(
Novikova, 1995: 11)
Before Revolution, Russia was a country
in which the official ruler of all state territory was Russian people. During
the revolution the things have changed. Russia started to fall down into
separate parts, if not the Russian people who have saved the situation. That
Russia, of which Russian people were the owners, came to a history. Revolution
has proposed USSR an ideal entity which united groups of separated republics
into socialistic, trying to implement the only social build. It was a great
unifying factor. Proletariat of all people of the USSR, headed by the communist
party of Russia became the only owner of Russian territory. (Novikova,
1995:194) The dictatorship of one class and multinational country underlined
the identity of Russia those days.
II.4. The
Theory of Civilizations
The theory of civilizations was formed in the process of
studying the problem. The founders of it were Danilevsky, Veber, Shpengler,
Sorokin, Toinbi. Later, in the second half of the 20th century, this
problem was studied by many western thinkers. Civilization is a sociocultural
entity, which is formed on the basis of universal values, including world
religions, systems of morality, arts. This theory has grown into a theory of
civilizations. (Shapovalov 2001:13)
Observing Russia as one of the local civilizations, which has
peculiar traits was formed on the contradictions of local civilization and the
most common definition of “Russian civilization”. One of the contradictions was
that the majority of people’s with different civilization orientation made
Russia a segmented society. However, this was later developed, and civilization
received its value in the majority of peoples who make up the ethnical
composition of Russia. Another argumentation which the theory gained, and which
didn’t receive a concrete development, was that the history of Russia had
breakages, for example, it was a Kievan Rus, Moscow Rus, Russia of Peter the
Great, Soviet Russia, etc. It was a significantly different basis for
development of Russian civilization. (Shapovalov 2002:18)
One can talk about modern Russian civilization starting from
the Peter’s reforms, in the 18th century, which has put a basis of
that civilization in Russia, in which we continue to live nowadays. In Russia’s
project, many theorists approve the fact that Russia follows Westernized way,
however in the works of theorists from abroad, Russia is given its own way of
development, and it is said to have its defined Russian place in the world
system. Russia has its positive important factor in the world system. (Shapovalov
2002:21) Russia is a super ethnic entity, and is has a cultural Russian soil.
It significantly defines the style of life and thoughts, which are typical for
civilization. It is very important from the view of civilization. (Shapovalov
2002:23)
Thesis about the mentality of Russian culture became
important nowadays. Some modern authors use it to explain the phenomenon of
Russian totalitarism of the 20th century. In their logic, Russian
totalitarism has its roots almost in Kievan Russia. Research of Russia as a
difficult civilization, we can begin from the social psychology, trying to make
a research in Russian soul, and then to bring them in the peculiarities of
economical, social and cultural basis. (Shapovalov 2002:27) The most important
resource of civilization- its people, and the most important quality of people
is a life power, based on the understanding of historical destiny. Mostly, it
concentrates on the character of people, and on its distinctive traits. (Shapovalov
2002:46)
II.5.
My considerations
For every state, in a certain period of time there may be
applied a term of civilization. Foundation of civilization is being made in
historically defined period of time, and it reflects ideology of this
particular state. Ideology of state is formed by social consciousness of
people. Russian civilization has defined history and time chronology.
Development of Russian civilization has been developed constantly, in
conjunction with European civilizations, who had big influence on development
of Russian civilization. However, what should be taken into consideration, that
Russian civilization has been developed in a gap from European civilizations. I
consider, that the main reason of this gap in development was a big territory
of state, which was not ruled properly, differences in the development of
Eastern as well as Western parts of Russia, separated nature of Russian territory,
differences in people’s number in Eastern and Western parts of Russia, in
result of which there has been a difference in creating and rule of decrets in
different parts of Russia. Western part of Russia was always more progressive.
Here, revolutions were made, reforms were accomplished, the level of social
development has been followed. Eastern part was not so developed, however from
there came the existing theory of mentality and Russian soul. Russia as state,
with certain level of civilization has to gone through historically defined
periods of time, and society had to go through defined historical development
for civilization to emerge. Russia from times, has gone very difficult, from
one part of formation to another, because of its poor level of development, and
not ability of society to go through these formations. Russia didn’t have
democratic society with its values. For one formation to another, there should
be a certain influence from the side. But the society, which was all about
avtoritarism, was not able to define itself and reorganize itself. For democratization
in Russia, there should be certain time and free people with different
consciousness.
Considering all this, I should say that I have asked myself a
question: does the identity of Russia exist, is there a specific Russian,
original Russian identity. Proving the fact, one might say that it exists. What
kind of identity is it? What a current state creates out of this identity.
What is Russia in the international system? Or is the power of Russia in its
people? In Orthodoxy? Is Russian state under construction? To which direction
does Russia develops? To the East or to the West?
For myself, I define next things:
First, a history of Russian state is
full of victories, tragedies, and relief. Since the Christianity of Russia till
20th century, with its revolutionary ideas, monarchy, Civil War, Stalin period,
Second World War, development of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev Perestroika, with
his new ideas of democratization of the society, Period of Eltsin and Putin.
Every period of history defined the ideology of the state, its identity, and
formed its generation of people, as well as formed internal and external
politics of state. The internal politics of state was formed by the governing
elite existing in the society. External politics of state was always formed by
the perceptance of state as a huge power, and its multinationalities. Especially,
it was recognizable in the years of the Soviet Union, in the period of
disintegration of the Soviet Union. State has lost its power, received
characteristics of a weak state. This, therefore, defined behaviors of people
in the society, and considerations from foreign states. Little by little,
Russia becomes economically more strong state, which defines economically and
politically in the world. In a short period of time, Russia has undergone a
historical change in its political development, from monarchy to a democratic
state, through anarchy and avtoritarism. This historical period influenced on
the international reputation and self-definition of state in a modern world.
Second, culturally, Russia is very rich.
Its enough to mention world famous writers: Tolstoi, Dostoevsky, Bulgakov,
Solzhenitsin, etc. The role of intelligentsia in Russia was very contradictory
in Russia. It formed an ideology of Russia. Many films in the years of Soviet
Union were the examples of formation of the state, and this formed ideology
and self-identity of Russia.
Third, Orthodoxy is a defined religion in
Russia before the revolution, and then in the 1920s it was separated from the
state. New impulse it received nowadays. The accent is made nowadays on
manyconfessionality. The Church nowadays is not able to influence the decisions
which are taken inside of the state. The Church influences the development of
the state, on its formation of mentality and ideology in the state. In Russia,
people are unified by common idea. This common idea is formed in the minds of
people, through the Church, through Media, through culture.
Fourth, Russian state has a peculiar
geographical position. It has its considerations to the East and to the West.
Therefore, Russia follows balanced strategy with Europe and Asia. Russia has to
follow the well-balanced strategy with the West, and with the East, and find
balance between different countries with different levels of state structure
(China, Northern Korea, Japan, Arab countries, Europe, with democratic
structures of power).
I see that the issue of Russian identity
is quite a complicated subject. It involves many things, such as the issue of
ethnicities, peoples, cultures, religion, mentalities, as well as it is a broad
political question. Being a student of IR, I realized that it is very important
to look at the issue from the perspective of constructing identities, as well
as their development in time, their change, and common historical and political
discourses. I concluded for my self that there is a specific Russian identity
which has been developed in time, in Russia. I have given you a brief
description of it in my work. I also understood that there is an issue of
Russian identity which is evolving now, after the years of communism, which I haven’t
mentioned in my research paper. I consider them unnecessary to understand the
main discourse in history. I think that these years didn’t enrich Russian
state with values, on the other hand, they made a big hole in the whole Russian
history and made the face of Russia not very pleasant for foreign observers,
but very weird and scary. I decided not to involve them to my research, and
therefore, to escape from many ideological focuses of that time.
III. Values of Russian Identity
Next, from the point of constructivists,
identity formation is a process which brings people together under one state,
Russia. It is a process, it is a fundamental value, it’s value shaped in
history, it is a change, as well as the value to provide predictability and
order in state. I would say that it is the main value how people see and
construct ideology of a nation. It is a main value, with which people live and
maintain their ideological interests on behalf of the construction of nation.
Identity making is a value, through which people see their state, and accepted
in the world. It is a value, by which it is judged and given a certain
ideological impact on these of that nations, etc.
Next question that I want to answer, is
why Russia is historically Russian? The answer that I have found is given by
Mark Bassin, who states that “Russia’s geographical existence within a larger
zone of Eurasian civilization meant that Russian culture had been shaped to a
not insignificant extent by influences coming from Asia. Referring to a wide
historical array of manifestations of Russian culture, including folk music,
art, politics, religion, and even language, he repeatedly emphasized the
pre-eminent importance of connections to the east as compared to those to the
west. “The Russians, the Ugro-Finns, and the Volga Turks,” he wrote, “comprise
a cultural zone that has connections with both the Slavs and the ‘Turanian
East,’ and it is difficult to say which of these is more important.” Trubetskoi
argued moreover that Russia was Eurasian and not European (Slavic) not only by
virtue of its cultural patterns, but in terms of anthropological-racial
considerations as well. “Turkic blood mingles in Russian veins with that of the
Ugro-Finns and the Slavs,” he observed: “[I]t is usually forgotten that our
‘brothers’ (if not in language or faith, then in blood, character, and culture)
are not only the Slavs but the Turanians...”1 This dramatic insistence on the
Asian sources of the Russian ethos--on what Trubetskoi evocatively called
Russia’s “non-European, half-Asiatic face”-- was intended to leave no room
whatsoever for any doubt as to the fundamental chasm that set Russia apart in
every sense from Europe. As such, it forms without question the most
well-appreciated element of Eurasianism overall”[14].
These are a historically formed issues
that are significant for research in the identity of Russia. Every nation is a
matter of historical mission, development, and internal life. It is a
historically formed basis of every nation to find its own path of development,
and it’s a matter of controversies and disputes to find a common way of ideological
development and values, which are important for a given society. Russia has a
long history of ideological controversies and disputes, however, they have
received its own path of development nowadays.
The new Russian identity, which received
a discourse analyses in Russian media, and in politics, is the one which
significantly describes Russia as a huge national and supranational power. It
bring many issues to the discussion, for example the issue of self-identity of
Russia, “Russia is with its own original profile”, or that it has several
ideological orientations, “Russia is Europe”, or “Russia is Eurasia”, or
“Russia is neither West nor East”, etc. Therefore one might say that the
processes in Russia which it undergoes, lead to a specific ideological
contradiction, which signifies nor Eastern nor either Western specifics of
Russia. Preferably, most Russian theoreticians and politics say that there is a
common unique Russian way of development, which is the way that politicians
involve in their thinking and practice, however, in international space Russia
sometimes is seen as the country with no way of development, and the country
which borrows certain things from the West trying to improve internal
conditions. But there is , of course, a dispute, in which scholars try to
distinguish certain values for Russian state, and therefore, they try to see
over all possible solutions to the evolving identity of Russia. Some say, that
it is a historically evolved issue, some say that it is a matter of politics and
social life, however, in my paper I tried to show you all these different views
on the question.
In my view, I see all the perspectives as
a given fact, or an ideological compounds, which go in contradiction with each
other, however, they balance any contradictions, which evolve due to the
mentioned disputes. Any of the views I consider valuable and important,
however, the most important, which I have presented and argued about, present
its own statement, which can be recognized as existing in Russian society. Any
of the before mentioned issues can be characterized as making up the societal
type of thinking, approve by the politicians, and, on the other hand, being
formed throughout the history of Russia, its ideological conflict, which
received its result in different views on Russian way, be they Slavofiles, or
Westernisers, or, the dispute nowadays, to which direction Russia will go, to
the East, or to the West, the dispute Where does Russia belong: to Europe, to
Asia, or is it a Eurasia. From my view, Russia has its own path, however, it
borrows many of Western traits, which it applies later on to its own life and
economical and political development inside of Russia. However, the main
priorities are given to the West, where it finds support and interests. Here, I
want you to know the viewpoint of Zvonovsky, who says, that “a key component in
the process of identity formation is the division of the world into “us” and
“them” factions and the development of some perception of how Russians differ
from others. From this point of view, the West as a whole, and America as the
leader of the Western world, is the mirror in which Russians see
themselves—both in terms of their strengths and weaknesses. To a lesser extent
this view also contributes to assessments of the West, as well as the actions
of Western states. Russians still consider American society to be, if not an
example for simple implantation, at least a guide to orient them in many
spheres of social life.”
He states, that Russian citizens
themselves identify Russia in a provincial sense, and then somehow try to fit
it into a global context. Moreover, the United States, as the social “center,”
is accepted as the standard against which one measures and weighs the
periphery. Second, despite the fact that, for the majority of Russians,
American society seems to be a model for a more just set of social
arrangements, the United States remains a threat to Russian society. This
constitutes a radical difference from Russian public attitudes toward the United
States during the Soviet period. At that time the United States seemed to be
the key menace and the average Soviet citizen viewed American society as
being less just than their own. The two societies opposed one another with
equal confidence in the superiority and just nature of their own social
arrangements. Now Russians stand opposed (in their mind) to societies that they
feel are both more and less just than our own. In this case, isolationism
emerges as a reaction against an unattainable ideal—an expression of
frustration. What lies at the roots of such attitudes? Obviously, there is no
single irrefutable answer to this question During the first phase of reforms in
Russia, the United States and the West as a whole were perceived not only as
model, but also as a factor spurring the home government to implement more
liberal policies toward its citizens. Russians assumed that the activities of
the national government were the main obstacles to improving life for the
population to transform the government, via election or putsch (followed by the
latter’s suppression), and life would naturally change for the better. At the
same time, the population’s own activities and attitudes—with regard to work,
money, the law, and even God—could remain the same.
At last, Zvonovsky says, that Russian
residents consider the West a spatially remote authority within a series of
other authorities; in other words, they understand it as a supranational
extension of power. Thus, the more critically people estimate those relations,
which currently exist between the central government and regions, the more
critically they also estimate present relations between Russia and the West. In
other words, they divide global space not into Russia and the outside world,
but into the world of various authorities and the world of the individual’s
everyday being (Zvonovsky 2005).
However, in our case, we can see Russia as being oriented to the West, and I can prolong my arguments of why is it so. However, it has been a major driving force for Russia throughout the years that it has been following West, and it will continue to follow. In the Washington post, June 9, 2001 Michael A. McFaul has said that “between a continuation of engagement and a return to containment is a third path: realistic engagement. Bush needs to communicate to Putin that he believes in the possibility of Russia's integration into Europe and the Western community of states. But he also needs to clearly articulate the real terms of integration, terms that will require Russia to undergo serious political and economic changes. To help Russia integrate into the West, the American strategy must still be engagement, but with more realistic expectations about when, and with real standards for how this integration might occur”. “Russian society is currently divided as to whether Russia can or should aspire to become part of Europe again. Russian foreign policy elites also articulate two paths -- West and East -- for Russia's strategic orientation.”[15]. Here, all connected to external politics of Russia during the last decade or so. The priorities are given to the West, where Russia finds support and influence. Russian identity is so peculiar , so that it may be said that Russia rather goes in two dimensions, East and West. Russian national identity is not only a matter of Russian soul, but it may become a mass-based driving force for action and for change.
In my view, to see Russian identity as an
issue nowadays is to realize, how it was formed in history, and on the basis of
this knowledge, to establish a necessary framework to better understand the
whole political discourse about the issue. I see it as a big multinational
power. It gathers in itself the ethnicities and brings them together in one
state, Russia. People are a constant value, a subject of history, an internal
value, which during the centuries formed its culture, logic and made up future
perspectives. Russian people in history have gone through many developments and
changes. From Slavic Tribes to Kiev Rus, to a centralized system with Moscow in
the centre of state. The most interesting is that there is a unique complex of
national identification, and its in the history of Russian people. Religion,
which is important nowadays, and was also a matter of Russian life in history,
is a significant trait, which signifies Russian religious heritage. Orthodoxy,
which I am going to talk about, is one of the most important characteristics,
and a mater of life in Russian state.
Another important issue is a search for
common national idea. Flourishing the nation, preservation and development of
the national way of life and national interests are the core principles of
Russian nation. These principles are reflected by every step of Russian people.
They are vividly multiple and interesting to know and to follow, for example,
Russian holidays and traditions. They are very important for Russian people and
they in combination to a free nation, make up the cultural life of state.
Throughout the history of Russia, there was a constant search of ideas. Some
were taken from Western thinkers, some were created in Russia, to make up the
spirit of Russian people more significant, and to draw a historical line in
conjunction to which, a basis of Russian history and thinking were created.
They were the Slavofiles and Westernisers, nowadays, they are politicians, who
make up the most important steps to significantly make the Russian way of life
more solid, strong, and oriented to the West. They are the Western values,
which the state takes into account, and makes further steps to improve Russian
way of life. On the other hand, these are Russian people, who choose the path
to follow, and they are the ones who create the history of Russia from the
inside, and they are politicians, who make up the identity of Russia, in time,
taking into consideration, the basic values of international states and
following their rules and order.
Mark Bassin says, “As for the Russian
nation, it always was a center of ethnic and cultural attraction of not only
the Slavs, but also the adjoining peoples. In fact, Russians are defined more
by their geographic location than by blood. They have never constituted a
nation in the Western understanding of this term. Unlike the nations of Western
Europe, the Russians have never been obsessed with the idea of creating a
national state, and never equated the nation and the state. Russia’s national
idea always has been separate from the idea of Russian nationalism”[16].
Another view, “Today Russian society is undergoing a period
of dramatic change. Russian history was not smooth either. Since middle ages it
has been developing in different way from the European West. Steady evolution
of civil society in Europe after Enlightenment gave a stable framework for
development of identity there. The whole history of Russia is connected with
changes between different ends. Now the picture remains basically the same:
There are many different nonlinear processes which are taking place
simultaneously in Russian society in the meantime”[17].
Before-mentioned disputes are significant for the development
of ideological thinking inside of Russia. But what are the other values which
create Russian identity, in Russia. I consider Orthodoxy, a religious compound
of Russian nation, to prevail in life of people in Russia. Orthodoxy is a
significant value, which Russia has. It has been established hundreds of years
before, and now, it is a value, which is now a compound in the country’s
identity.
Why Orthodoxy, my next question? The idea of Russia as an
“Orthodox nation” has a long history; it ties in with both official definitions
and popular perceptions; it is also at the core of the historical and
philosophical debates that have aimed to delimit geopolitical place of Russia
and to understand the essence of “Russianness”. Russia is by no means unique in
this respect. The religious dimension has always played an important role in
the self-determination of peoples and nations. The conflicts of ancient and
medieval states were conflicts of gods. Religious traditions frequently
determined, in one way or another, how cultures and States were divided and
united. In Europe, contemporary nation-states developed on the basis of
communities that defined themselves partly in terms of their religious
affiliation: Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox. Later, in the twentieth century,
Islam, Buddhism and Catholicism have played a key role in the formation and
legitimation of the new nations of Asia and Latin America. (Agadjanian 2000)
Russian Orthodox identity was a
consolidating factor that united Russians of all social strata. At the same
time the similar role was played by the imperial identity. The Russians
historically have been a nation, that kept forming an empire. Russians in a
very high degree identified themselves with the empire. This fact explains to a
large degree the inherent particular features of Russian national
consciousness. The Russian national consciousness in this respect for a long
time has been tempted by a suspicion of being a God chosen people, that it had
a special purpose in the world. This role imposed from outside with a passage
of time became quite organic self perception[18].
The idea of an “Orthodox nation”
reappeared in Russia during the 1990s; the prerevolutionary past was then
brought into play, even though the contemporary situation in Russia differs
fundamentally from the situation in the nineteenth century. The Orthodox
“nature” of society and of the State was then a reality; Orthodoxy formed part
of the popular consciousness, of daily behavior and of State practice;
contemporary “Orthodox identity”, on the other hand, is rather a mythological
idiom that appeared in response to a need for a new identity. Prerevolutionary
society had gradually evolved towards a secularized and pluralist “formula of
identity”; contemporary society already seems to be secularized and pluralist
(as a legacy of the post-Communist period) and is seeking ways of gradually
including the elements of Orthodoxy within its “formula of identity”.
“Orthodoxy” in pre-revolutionary Russia was a religious reality permeating the
whole of society, while “Orthodoxy” in present-day Russia is only a reality
within the religious “field” and is essentially a kind of a cultural symbol,
used as an important ideological construct.
Russian national consciousness was strongly cemented by
Orthodoxy. Therefore it was much easier for it to acclaim, as its own member,
a representative of another ethnos, and not of another religion. In the
framework of the imperial identity both Poles, Germans, and Jews were
undoubtedly considered “our own”. In this way one nation combined an imperial
identity and Russian Orthodox identity. The first one dictated to recognize all
peoples of the Empire as “our own”. The second refused to accept the peoples,
different in a religious way, as “our own”. They were considered alien. This
dichotomy produced a very painful dual self perception. It considered proper
and alien halves as part of one organism. This unity was extremely
contradictory. We think, that this very dichotomy, constantly present in the
Russian national consciousness, has and continues to determine the chronic
crises of its self identification. Ethnic hatred is just one of the factors
and, to this respect, a negative one in a very complex and long process of
crystallization of ethnic identity of Russians[19].
There is a close connection in modern Russian mind between Orthodoxy and national identity. Orthodoxy is a symbol of Russian origins and spiritual worth, something that can be opposed to others. It is not a concept of a “believer”, and it does not contradict to any normal logic. The number of Orthodox in Russia is much greater than the number of believers, around 40 percent. It makes it clear that such “ideological” Orthodoxy has only very indirect relation to religious faith. Ethnos, peoples and religion have been bringing Russia together. The new cultural traditions formed its inter-culture from inside, and a constant dialogue between these cultures has made Russia’s cohesion close and culturally stable. From the outside, there were influences throughout the history of Russia, which made it possible still, to find its big position in the world and among states. Russian Church has played a significant role throughout the history of Russia unifying Russian people and bringing them culturally and spiritually together. Therefore, any ideological dispute, which has been a result of complicated historical events, is a matter of Russian self-identification. However, a religious value, is a significant trait of Russian consciousness, as well as Russian identity. Conclusion
Construction of
state is very important process which involves formations on the state level.
It is important from the view of constructivism, which sees identity as the main
discourse in the theories of IR. Identity of state shows how state is recognized
by other states, on the international level, and it constructs an idea of state
on the national level. To make these together, I may see it as it serves as a
fundamental value of the state. What kind of Russian state identity is, and
what values are making this identity were discussed in my paper.
State is
undergoing a process of construction constantly, under certain conditions. It
changes its identities and values. However, identity of state can be defined as
a constant value which evolves in time as a result of some processes inside of
the state, and the identity formation can be recognized as a value, which recognizes
state in its external affairs. But in my work, I saw it also as a process, in
which state is able to change its identity in time, and because of internal
influences, it changes its identity. Also, I aimed to show that identity has
its core in ethnos of the state, which is in people who compose this state. I
tried to recognize it as a value in identity formation. All the other defined
issues, such as Orthodoxy, or ideologies, etc. can be seen as theoretically
approved values, which create an identity of Russian state. From my view,
Russian state as a constant value brings in itself these mentioned in my work
values, and as process, it can be seen as a state formation process, in which
Russian state is seen in the system of states, and it is being ruled by
international laws. Therefore, state identity is being shaped by international
structures, and Russian state identity receives its already different value in
international order. Then, I wanted to mention the importance of theory of
constructivism which can be applied to external part of Russian state. Here, Russian
values are seen as given, and a new Russian identity of state is its policies
and behavior in the international system. The view on the identity of Russia is
different from the one which is developed inside of the state. National
politics is seen as a rule inside of the country, but external policies of
state are being recognized as a result of state rule in time, and the identity
which is being developed, is recognized as Russian state identity. In my work,
I tried to highlight two of the existing identities, however, I didn’t separate
them but showed them altogether making an accent on the significance of both.
Therefore, I see these values as additional to each other, and their common
aim, to open up the state identity of the state, as an entity, and as state as
such, as an important value in identity formation.
Next, I tried
to see more deeply on the constituting values in each of the visions. State
identity from the perspective of nationals, who give their own vision on the
problem, and also, I tried to make it clear that internationally, Russian state
can be foreseen as a state which undergoes certain change in time, and with
respect to policies of the state, Russia generates its state identity and is
accepted in the world system. I gathered material which I considered important
to open up the question more deeply. I touched all the issues that I consider
important for reflecting my ideas about Russian state identity, and I applied
to my research question all the necessary theoretical material to highlight the
problem.
International
vision on the problem is quite different from the one being developed inside of
Russia. National policies which create internal state identity are quite
different from the ones being developed in other countries. Therefore, I see
Russia as a unique state with certain important values and own national
identity.
Russia during the last ten years was experiencing a crisis of identity. It was connected to previous crises inside of the country, democratic and social problems and so on. It was hard to return to traditional path of nation-state development, which was signified by the inability to find common identity of Russian state, and it characterized state as lost in international political and economic systems. It was a significant development in Russia which had a fundamental character. Finally, Russia has found its place in international world system and developed a new Russian identity. Russia has integrated into the world economy. After a long negotiations, Russia has been included onto the G-8 as a full member. Now, Russia expects a full assistance and support from the West and the United States. Probably, geopolitical question was in general selected as the most important, and Russia has gained more than it has expected, for example, Russia has selected the US as a major power. In respect, the US has introduced the concept of its global leadership, equal to monopolar world. On the other hand, there were some misperceptions, especially connected to NATO, and its expansion. It is still a confrontation and a matter of mutual suspicions and misperceptions between the US and Russia. In result, Russia has decided about its position in the world to rely on its own potential and capabilities in restructuring its economy. Integration into the world economy was left as a matter of future considerations, such values as democracy, market economy and civil society were decided to be strengthened, and in foreign policy Russia has had to be identified and sticked to its national interests. For the coming years, Russia will keep this identity matters. However, during the time of crisis of economics and politics in Russia, the crisis of identity appeared. The notion of national idea has appeared as a state’s historical idea, and a search of historical mission as well as national historical tasks has appeared more significantly. Russia stands on the two ends of foreign policy. It balances between East and West, preferably choosing the West as a path to follow and to negotiate with. It grants the West a significant task of strengthening Russia in the spheres such as economy, politics, including International Politics. It gives an example to Russia how to build up the country. It provides significant ties in politics, as well as economical ties, which strengthen and unify Russia. Russia is an ethnical community, which brings in itself specificities. It is a historically build-up nation, which has its significant traits, and which prolongs its existence. It is a strong nation, which has survived through the years of history and change, and it´s a nation, which strongly holds its position in the World and in Eurasia. Russia is constructing its nation. Russia is building up the nation on micro and macro levels. Russia has its behavior in the World Politics and provides a strong ties within the economy and politics in the World and the International system. Russia brings in itself a special nation in the World, and characterizes by a continuity in its political life and behavior. Bibliography:
Alexander Agadjanian “Religious Pluralism and National
Identity in Russia “
International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol.
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